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THE IN LOCO PARENTIS STATUS OF ILLINOIS
SCHOOLTEACHERS: AN UNJUSTIFIABLY
BROAD EXTENSION OF IMMUNITY
INTRODUCTION

Although parents may choose not to do so, they have long
understood their right to use physical force to discipline their
children for misbehavior. To the extent that such discipline
does not constitute willful or wanton misconduct, Illinois parents
enjoy immunity from liability for their use of corporal punishment, even where injury to the child results.'
What parents may not realize, however, is that under a
doctrine known as in loco parentis,2 Illinois schoolteachers enjoy
the same immunity as parents when disciplining a student in
school. This legal protection applies even if a particular school
board or district has a policy against the use of corporal punishment,3 and even if the teacher may have sanctions imposed upon
him by his employer for disregarding the school's prohibition
against corporal punishment. Thus, parents may be surprised
to learn that if their child is injured by a teacher's disciplinary
spanking, that teacher has an affirmative defense under Illinois
law, 4 even though the teacher was negligent in inflicting the
corporal punishment and was also disregarding the school's
policy against such punishment.
More alarming is the plight of the Illinois schoolchild who
has been injured by a teacher's negligence in nondisciplinary
school-related activities. In Kobylanski v. Chicago Board of
Education,5 the Illinois Supreme Court recently held that those
1. See generally text accompanying notes 50-65 infra.
2. "In the place of a parent; instead of a parent; charged, factitiously,
with a parent's rights, duties, and responsibilities."
BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 896 (4th ed. rev. 1968).
3. See generally Estep, School Discipline Is Just a Whack Away,
Chicago Tribune, Nov. 2, 1976, at 1, col. 1.
4. The School Code provides in relevant part:
Teachers and other certificated educational employees shall
maintain discipline in the schools, including school grounds which
are owned or leased by the board and used for school purposes
and activities. In all matters relating to the discipline in and conduct of the schools and the school children, they stand in the relation of parents and guardians to the pupils. This relation shall
extend to all activities connected with the school program and may
be exercised at any time for the safety and supervision of the
pupils in the absence of their parents or guardians.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, §§ 24-24, 34-84a (1975).
5, 63 Ill. 2d 165, 347 N.E.2d 705 (1976).
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sections of the School Code which deal with the duty of teachers
to maintain discipline" were intended to confer the status of in
loco parentis on teachers in nondisciplinary as well as disciplinary matters. The court reasoned that teachers standing in loco
parentis should be subjected to no greater liability than parents,
who are liable to their children for willful and wanton misconduct, but not for negligence.7 The impact of this decision is
that certificated educational employees are not liable for negligent conduct resulting in injury to students as long as such
conduct occurs within any activity connected with the school
program.
That teachers and other certificated school employees in
Illinois stand in the relation of parents and guardians to their
pupils is not disputed. The purpose of this comment is to
analyze the reasoning and impact of cases construing this in loco
parentis relationship in Illinois schools. An analysis of relevant
cases provides insight into what is, and what should be, the
scope of protection afforded to teachers by this parental relationship to their students.
FOUNDATION

FOR THE IN Loco PARENTIS CONCEPT

A combination of the statutory law affecting schoolteachers
and their employers and the common law of parental immunity
forms the foundation of protection afforded Illinois schools and
schoolteachers for wrongful acts committed upon their students.
A clearer understanding of in loco parentis protection will
result from tracing the development of this statutory and common-law foundation.
HistoricalPerspective of School Immunity
The statutory in loco parentis protection of schools and
schoolteachers is a relatively recent development in Illinois law.,
Formerly, protection of schools and teachers against negligence
suits or other tort actions was based on an agency concept. In
1898, the Illinois Supreme Court determined that a board of
education was an agent of the state.9 The court reasoned that
6. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, §§ 24-24, 34-84a (1975).
See note 4
supra.
7. 63 Ill. 2d at 173, 347 N.E.2d at 709.
8. House Bill 691, which added sections 24-24 and 34-84a to the
School Code, was passed June 28, 1965, and approved July 13, 1965. Act
of July 13, 1965, 1965 Ill. Laws 1459.
9. Kinnare v. City of Chicago, 171 Ill. 332, 335, 49 N.E. 536, 537
(1898) (a board of education erecting a school building pursuant to
duties imposed upon it by statute, being merely the agent of the state,
was held not liable in damages, as master, for the negligent acts of its

workman).
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because the state, as sovereign, does not submit its action to the
judgment of courts, and is therefore not liable for the torts of the
agents through whom it acts, then the board of education should
likewise be exempted for the negligent acts of its servants unless
such liability is expressly provided by the statute creating such
agency. 10 The rule that school districts are not liable for the
torts or negligence of their agents unless their liability is expressly provided by statute was reiterated in subsequent cases. 1
The Molitor Case
Until 1959, school districts, as municipal agents of the
state, were immune from tort liability because the state itself was
immune from such liability. In Molitor v. Kaneland Community District No. 302,12 however, the Illinois Supreme Court shook
the foundations of the common law doctrine of municipal tort
immunity. Molitor involved a child who was injured when the
school bus in which he was riding ran off the road, hit a culvert,
exploded and burned. The complaint, alleging that the school
district was negligent, was dismissed by the circuit court on the
ground that the school district, as an agent of the sovereign state,
was immune from tort liability. The Illinois Supreme Court
reversed in a lengthy opinion which re-examined municipal tort
immunity and held it no longer to be the law of Illinois. '3 The
court stated the problem with a rhetorical question:
It is a basic concept underlying the whole law of torts today
that liability follows negligence, and that individuals and corporations are responsible for the negligence of their employees
acting in the course of their employment. The doctrine of governmental immunity runs directly counter to that basic concept.
What reasons, then, are so impelling as to allow a school district, as a quasi-municipal corporation, to commit wrongdoing
10. Id.

11. See Chicago City Bank & Trust Co. v. Board of Educ., 386 Ill.
508, 54 N.E.2d 498 (1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 734 (1944) (a school

district is a quasi-municipal corporation and is not liable for a breach
of duty of its officers); Leviton v. Board of Educ., 374 Ill. 594, 30 N.E.2d
497 (1940) (quasi-municipal corporations are not liable to individuals
injured by the tortious conduct of the officers or servants of such corporations); Lindstrom v. City of Chicago, 331 Ill. 144, 162 N.E. 128
(1928) (as school districts are created nolens volens by the general law
to aid in the administration of state government and are charged as
such with duties purely governmental in character, they are not liable
for the torts or negligence of their agents unless such liability is expressly provided by statute).
12. 18 Ill. 2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 968
(1960).
13. The court stated that "[t]he doctrine of school district immunity
was created by this court alone. Having found that doctrine to be
unsound and unjust under present conditions, we consider that we have
not only the power, but the duty, to abolish that immunity." Id. at 25,
163 N.E.2d at 96.

602 The John Marshall Journal of Practice and Procedure [Vol. 10: 599

without any responsibility to its victims, while any individual
would be called to task in court for such
or private corporation
14
tortious conduct?
Justice Klingbiel's opinion isolated the two prevailing justifications for governmental immunity: that the sovereign can
do no wrong; and that immunity protects public funds and
property. The court noted that the Revolutionary War was
fought to abolish the divine right of kings, which is the basis of
sovereign immunity. 5 Further, the court found it incredible that
the medieval absolutism of sovereign immunity should exempt
various branches of government from liability for their torts, and
that the entire burden of damage resulting from the wrongful
acts of the government should be imposed upon the individual
who suffers the injury. 16 Justice Klingbiel reasoned that the
burden of damages should be distributed among the entire
community constituting the government, where it could be borne
17
without hardship upon any individual.
The second theory of governmental immunity-the protection of public funds and public property theory-seeks to prevent the diversion of tax money, in this case school funds, to the
payment of damage claims.' 8 It is based on the argument that
school districts would be bankrupt and education impeded if
school districts were called upon to compensate children negligently injured by the district's agents and employees. The
premise behind this theory seems to be that it is better for the
individual to suffer than for the public to be inconvenienced.
The court observed that the protection of public funds
theory could not justify school tort immunity when public education constituted one of the biggest businesses in the country.'0
The court noted that the abolition of school tort immunity in
'California, Tennessee, New York, Washington and other states
did not result in bankruptcy and shut-down of the schools in
those states. The diversion of tax funds argument was also held
to be fallacious in light of the provisions of the Illinois School
20
Code authorizing appropriation for transportation purposes,
14. Id. at 20, 163 N.E.2d at 93.
15. Id. at 22, 163 N.E.2d at 94.
16. Id. at 21, 163 N.E.2d at 94.
17. Id.
18. See Thomas v. Broadlands Community. Consol. School Dist. No.
201, 348 Ill. App. 567, 109 N.E.2d 636 (1952) (if taxes, which are raised

for specific governmental purposes, could be diverted to the payment
of damage claims, then the important work which every municipality
must perform would be seriously impaired).
19. 18 Ill. 2d at 22, 163 N.E.2d at 94.
20. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 122, § 17-6.1 (1957) (current version at ch.

122, §§ 29-1 to 29-16 (1975), as amended by Act of July 22, 1976, § 1,
1976 Ill. Laws 1306 (ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 122, § 29-5 (1976 Supp.) )).
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issuance of bonds for the payment of claims, 2' and expenditures
of school tax funds for school bus liability insurance.2 2 The
court found no valid reason why school funds properly spent to
pay liability insurance premiums could not be spent to pay the
liability itself in the absence of insurance. ' ,"
The court concluded that the rule of school district tort
immunity was unjust, unsupported by any valid reason, and had
no rightful place in modern society.2 4 The abolition of such
immunity would encourage school districts to exercise greater
care. School districts would also be encouraged to carry adequate insurance to spread the risk of accident, just as other costs
25
of education are spread over the entire district.
Post-Molitor Legislation
Shortly after Molitor was announced, the legislature nullified the decision by enacting a series of bills granting absolute
and total immunity to park districts generally, 2" the Chicago
Park District,27 forest preserve districts, 8 and counties. 291 Further, the legislature limited the damages recoverable from public
school districts and private nonprofit schools to $10,000 for
each cause of action. 30 The first time the Illinois Supreme
Court had occasion to review any of the new legislation on its
merits, the statute granting total immunity to park districts was
3
held unconstitutional in Harvey v. Clyde Park District. 1
Harvey involved injury to a minor suffered while using a
slide maintained by the defendant park district. The court,
speaking through Justice Schaefer, reviewed the statutory pattern that had developed in Illinois, and concluded that "the
statute relied upon by the defendant is arbitrary, and unconstitu21. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 19-10 (1957)
REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 19-8

(1975)).

22. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 29-11a (1957)
REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 29-9 (1975)).

(current version at ILL.
(current version at ILL.

23. 18 Ill. 2d at 23, 163 N.E.2d at 95.
24. Id. at 25, 163 N.E.2d at 96.
25. Id.
26. Act of July 9, 1959, 1959 Ill. Laws 782 (originally codified at
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 105, § 12.1-1 (1959)); Act of July 9, 1959, 1959 Ill. Laws
782 (originally codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 105, § 491 (1959)).
27. Act of July 22, 1959, 1959 Ill. Laws 2020 (originally codified at
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 105, § 333.2a (1959)).
28. Act of July 22, 1959, 1959 Ill. Laws 1954 (originally codified at
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 57 , § 3a (1959)).
29. Act of July 22, 1959, 1959 Ill. Laws 1890 (originally codified at
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 34, § 301.1 (1959)). Although Molitor applied only
to school districts, the reasoning and the rationale relied upon left no
doubt that the concept would be extended to other local governmental
entities. Latturner, Local Governmental Tort Immunity and Liability
in Illinois, 55 ILL. B.J. 28, 29 (1966).
30. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, §§ 825, 829 (1959).
31. 32 Ill. 2d 60, 203 N.E.2d 573 (1965).
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tionally discriminates against the plaintiff. '32 To illustrate the
discriminatory situation that existed, Justice Schaefer pointed
out that if the child had been injured on a slide negligently
maintained by the city or village, there was no statutory bar to
recovery; if the slide was negligently maintained by a school
district, only limited recovery was possible by statute; but if the
slide was negligently maintained by a park district, the statute
33
barred recovery.
Though the court in Harvey held that the statute involved
was unconstitutional, it did not say that any grant of immunity
would be unconstitutional per se. On the contrary, the court
recognized that there may be valid policy reasons that would
move the legislature to grant immunity. The court then attempted to instruct the General Assembly on an acceptable
scheme, noting that it would be "feasible . . . to classify in
terms of types of municipal function, instead of classifying
among different governmental agencies that perform the same
function. '3 4 The court also suggested that if exceptions to
liability were to be made, the "discretionary function" exception
85
found in the Federal Tort Claims Act would be permissible.
Harvey made it clear that all existing statutes giving total or
partial immunity to any type of local government would meet
the same fate, and indeed subsequent cases have so indicated. 6
Tort Immunity Act
Shortly after the Illinois Supreme Court in Harvey had
offered instructive dicta on acceptable classifications for exceptions to governmental tort liability, 37 the legislature responded
32. It is important to note that the unconstitutional discrimination

results not from treating governmental units in different ways, but from
making an individual's recovery depend solely on which governmental

unit happens to be involved. Id. at 65, 203 N.E.2d at 576.
33. Id. at 67, 203 N.E.2d at 577.
34. The Federal Tort Claims Act (28 U.S.C. §§ 1346 (b), 2671-80)
provides, in part, that the waiver of immunities provided for in the Act"
would not apply to any claim "based upon the exercise or performance
or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty

on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government,
whether or not the discretion involved be abused." 28 U.S.C. § 2680

(1970).
35. 39 Ill. 2d 136, 233 N.E.2d 549 (1968).
36. See Treece v. Shawnee Community Unit School Dist., 39 Ill.
2d 136, 233 N.E.2d 549 (1968), where the court implied that a $10,000
limitation on tort recovery from public school districts would be held
invalid. See also Haymes v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 41 Ill. 2d 336,
243 N.E.2d 203 (1968), where the court held that a $10,000 limitation
on tort recovery from private nonprofit schools was unconstitutional.
Thus, the legislature's attempt to replace the loss of total immunity of
school districts with limited liability in 1959 was rendered ineffective
by the supreme court's decisions in Harvey, Treece and Haymes.
37. See text accompanying notes 33-34 supra.
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with the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees
Tort Immunity ActA8 This Act applies to local public entities
including all local governmental bodies, municipal and quasimunicipal corporations, and school boards and districts. 39 In
accordance with the Harvey requirement, all provisions apply to
each type of governmental entity; no special treatment is given to
any particular form of local government. The statute applies to
40
any injury to person or property.
Basic to the Tort Immunity Act is the fact that a government acts or fails to act through its employees. Therefore, most
governmental liability depends upon the doctrine of respondeat
superior. 41 In an action brought against a governmental employee individually, arising out of an act or omission within the
scope of his employment, the Tort Immunity Act shifts the
burden of defense and judgment to the public entity by requiring
it either to appear and defend the claim or to indemnify the
employee completely for all court costs and judgments or settlements. 42 When the governmental entity is sued directly for the
act or omission of an employee, besides having any defense that
would be available to a private person, 43 it may assert the
44
nonliability of the employee as an absolute defense.
The general basis of the immunity of a local public entity in
respondeat superior actions is summed up in one key section
which states that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by Statute, a
public employee serving in a position involving the determination of policy or the exercise of discretion is not liable for an
injury resulting from his act or omission in determining policy
when acting in the exercise of such discretion even though
abused. '45 The remainder of the Act consists of provisions
which set forth specific applications of, or exceptions to, this
general rule.
The School Code Sections on Discipline
Just prior to the enactment of the Tort Immunity Act, 46 the
38. Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act, 1965 Ill. Laws 2982 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, §§ 1-101
to 10-101 (1975) (amended 1976)) [hereinafter cited as Tort Immunity
Act].
39. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, § 1-206 (1975).

40. Id. § 1-204.
41. "Let the master answer.

This maxim means that a master is

liable in certain cases for the wrongful acts of his servant, and a principal for those of his agent."

rev. 1968).
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, § 2-302 (1975).

1475 (4th ed.

Id.§ 2-110.
Id. § 2-109.
Id. § 2-201.
House Bill 691, which added sections 24-24 and 34-84a to the
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Illinois General Assembly approved two additions to the School
Code. 47 These sections require teachers and other certificated
educational employees to maintain discipline in the schools and
on the school grounds.
For the legal protection of the teachers, and, as a result of
the Tort Immunity Act, of their employers, the School Code
additions confer in loco parentis status upon the teachers:
In all matters relating to the discipline in and conduct of the
schools and the school children, they stand in the relation of
parents and guardians to the pupils. This relationship shall extend to all activities connected with the school program and
may be exercised at any time for the safety and supervision of
48
the pupils in the absence of their parents or guardians.
By reason of these additions, which confer parental status upon
teachers, all of common law parental immunity is incorporated
into the School Code.
ParentalImmunity
Under sections 24-24 and 34-84a of the School Code, teachers assume the same liability for their wrongful acts toward
students as the students' parents would assume had they committed the same wrongful act toward their children. 49 Therefore,
parents' liability for wrongful acts committed upon their children is determinative of teachers' liability when the teachers are
standing in loco parentis. The following Illinois cases define the
limits of parental liability and/or immunity for torts to their
children.
The first Illinois Supreme Court case concerning parental
liability to children was Nudd v. Matsoukas.5
In Nudd, the
defendant was driving his car with his wife and two minor
children on a foggy, wet night. He drove through a stop light at
an excessive rate of speed and collided with another auto, resulting in the death of the defendant's wife and one child. His
other child was severely injured. The plaintiff filed an action
for willful and wanton misconduct on behalf of the surviving
child.
School Code, was approved June 28, 1965, and was enacted July 13, 1965;

Act of July 13, 1965, 1965 Ill. Laws 1459. House Bill 1963, which enacted

the Tort Immunity Act, passed June 30, 1965, and was enacted August 13,
1965; see note 38 supra.
47. Act of July 13, 1965, 1965 Ill. Laws 1459 (codified at ILL. RExV.
STAT. ch. 122, §§ 24-24, 34-84a (1975)). See note 4 supra. The pertinent
wording of each section is identical. Section 34-84a applies to cities with

a population greater than 500,000 and section 24-24 applies to all others.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. 7 Ill. 2d 608, 131 N.E.2d 525 (1956).
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The supreme court reviewed the Illinois appellate court
decisions on parental immunity. The court noted that the rule
of parental immunity was first stated in Hewlett v. George,5 1 an
1891 Mississippi case, without citation of authority. Four years
later, an Illinois appellate court adopted the rule of parental
immunity from tort liability in Foley v. Foley,52 also without
citation of authority. The doctrine was restated in Meece v.
Holland Furnace Co.,5" another appellate court case. The supreme court in Nudd did not consider these appellate court cases
as sufficient authority to preclude the court's examination of the
54
basic policy issues behind granting tort immunity to parents.
The only justification that the court found for the rule of
parental immunity was a reluctance to create litigation and strife
between members of the family unit. The court held that while
this policy might justify immunity from suits for negligence
within the scope of the parental relationship, it could not justify
immunity from suits for willful and wanton misconduct on the
part of a parent.5 5 The court reasoned that no social benefit
could derive from the toleration of willful and wanton parental
misconduct, and that depriving a child of redress for such
misconduct would not foster family unity.56
In 1968, in Schenk v. Schenk, a new dimension was added
to the parental tort immunity doctrine. 5 In Schenk, a father
sued his seventeen year old unemancipated daughter for injuries
he sustained when she negligently ran into him with an automobile while he was a pedestrian on a public street. Although the
roles of the plaintiff and defendant were reversed from the usual
parental immunity cases, the appellate court handled this by
treating the issue as family immunity rather than as parental
immunity.
Since the duty breached by the daughter in the operation of
the auto was the same duty owed by her to all pedestrians using
the public streets, the cause of action did not arise out of any
father-daughter or family relationship. From this the court
concluded that family immunity from tort liability applied only
when the wrongful act occurred while the parties were engaged
in conduct arising out of the family relationship or in the fur51. 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891).
52. 61 Ill. App. 577 (1895).
53. 269 Ill. App. 164 (1933). The statement of parental immunity was
not necessary to the holding of the case because the suit was against the
father's employer.
54. 7 Ill. 2d at 617, 131 N.E.2d at 530.
55. Id. at 619, 131 N.E.2d at 531.
56. Id.
57. 100 Ill.
App. 2d 199, 241 N.E.2d 12 (1968).
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therance of the usual family objectives.5" Thus, the appellate
court added a new element to the defense of family or parental
immunity: the tort must occur between parent and child while
acting in their family roles or functions.
In Schenk the appellate court also noted that in some other
states the parental immunity doctrine had eroded "like the allday sucker in the hands of a small child until there isn't much
left but the stick itself."5 9 However, it reviewed Nudd and
concluded that the foundation for the parental immunity doctrine discussed therein was still sound.60 Furthermore, the court
reasoned that abolition of parental immunity would result in a
flood of litigation, and it found that the assumption of the role of
father by either the courts or the state was foreign to our way of
life.61
In 1970, parental immunity in a negligence case was at
issue in Cosmopolitan National Bank of Chicago v. Heap.62 The
bank, as guardian for an unemancipated minor child, sued the
father for the child's personal injuries caused by the father's
negligence in permitting a loose, ill-fitting stairway rug to be
used in the family home. The appellate court, noting that the
Illinois Supreme Court had never been called upon to apply the
parental immunity doctrine to a mere negligence case, decided to
apply the doctrine to this negligence case on the basis of the
supreme court's dicta in Nudd 3 and the appellate court's holding in Schenk.6 4 Thus the father was found not liable!65
From the preceding cases, it is evident that parental immunity is not applicable when the parent commits a willful and
wanton wrongful act upon his unemancipated child. However,
to promote the public policy against creation of family strife and
to prevent a flood of litigation, the parental immunity doctrine
will be invoked to protect the parent from liability for negligent
acts upon his child unless such acts do not arise out of the family
relationship or in furtherance of the usual family objectives.
CASE CONSTRUCTION OF TEACHERS' TORT IMMUNITY

Since the enactment of the Tort Immunity Act and the
58. Id. at 204, 241 N.E.2d at 14.
59. Id.
60. See text accompanying notes 55-56 supra.
61. 100 Ill. App. 2d at 205-06, 241 N.E.2d at 15.
62. 128 Ill. App. 2d 165, 262 N.E.2d 826 (1970).
63. See text accompanying notes 55-56 supra.
64. See text accompanying notes 60-61 supra.
65. Cosmopolitan was a First District Appellate Court case. In Johnson v. Myers, 2 Ill. App. 3d 844, 277 N.E.2d 778 (1972), the Second District Appellate Court held that when the family relationship had been
dissolved by death of the negligent parent, the policy behind the rule of
family immunity ceases and the injured child could recover damages
from the deceased parent's estate.
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sections on teacher discipline in the School Code, the Illinois
courts have had several opportunities to construe the immunity
of teachers and their employers.
When reviewing cases
involving tort suits on behalf of students, it should be borne in
mind that although the School Code commands teachers to
maintain discipline, it protects them by granting them in loco
parentis status; and it is the common law which provides the
scope of parental immunity thereby granted to the teachers. In
addition, not only does the Tort Immunity Act give other defenses to teachers, but it also grants to their employers the same
immunities which the teachers enjoy. The interplay of these
statutes and the common law is often determinative of whether
or not the student will recover damages. Absent willful and
wanton negligence, 66 a teacher's immunity from tort liability can
best be understood by an examination of the circumstances
under which the student may suffer a wrongful act.
Corporal Punishment
Physical force is one method of maintaining discipline in
schools. 67 The use of physical force by a teacher was at issue in
City of Macomb v. Gould.68 In Gould, a teacher was at a high
school football game, and had the duty of keeping the crowd
away from the playing field. When an injured player was taken
to the sidelines, some students pressed near to get a closer look.
The teacher ordered the students back into the stands, and, as
they retreated, one of them uttered a groan. The teacher spun
that student around and started hitting him repeatedly on the
face. Six witnesses testified they saw the teacher strike the
student with a closed fist as well as with an open hand. A
police officer stopped the fight.
The teacher was charged with violating a city ordinance
prohibiting fighting. His defense was that he was enforcing
discipline, and that as a teacher he had the right to use corporal
punishment. Recognizing that a well defined standard between
what is reasonable and what is malicious disciplinary conduct
66. The definition of willful and wanton negligence which has been
repeatedly cited by the Illinois courts was enunciated in Schneiderman
v. Interstate Transit Lines, Inc. as:
A willful or wanton injury must have been intentional or the act
must have been committed under circumstances exhibiting a reckless disregard for the safety of others, such as failure, after knowledge of impending danger, to exercise ordinary care to prevent it
or a failure to discover the danger through carelessness when it
could have been discovered by the exercise of ordinary care.
394 Ill. 569, 583, 69 N.E.2d 293, 300 (1946).

67. See note 3 supra.
68. 104 Ill. App. 2d 361, 244 N.E.2d 634 (1969).
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does not exist, the court held that though a teacher may enforce
discipline by punishing with a switch or a paddle, clubbing over
the head is a malicious and unreasonable use of force. The
court affirmed the teacher's conviction and found it unnecessary
to consider the teacher's in loco parentis status due to the finding
of willful and wanton negligence. 69
Not all punishment for misbehavior in school is physical.
Wexell v. Scott 70 involved verbal punishment. In Wexell, the
teacher called her eleven year old student worthless, undependable and incompetent, and declared further that he was unfit ever
to marry; and that if he did, his children would be ashamed of
him. Wexell contended that he suffered great mental anguish,
requiring the care of a physician as a result of this intentional
tort. He agreed that a teacher stands in loco parentis in the
disciplining of children in the classroom and may inflict corporal
punishment. The issue was whether the same principles apply
in the use of verbal chastisement as apply in the use of corporal
punishment.
The court restated its belief that the teacher stands in loco
parentis, and held that disparaging comments about a pupil may
be necessary and perhaps conducive to proper educational discipline, in the absence of negligence or wantonness. While not
agreeing with the teacher's choice of words, the court observed
that there are few students who have not been belittled by their
parents for their shortcomings, and no liability should be imposed for similar chastisement during that part of the day when
the teacher assumes the role of parent.7 1
Sometimes a teacher may discipline a student for misbehavior which took place in part on school property and in part away
from school property. In People v. DeCaro,72 for example, a
Chicago public school teacher appealed a conviction of criminal
battery on two students. 73 The teacher testified that the two students in question had used obscene and defamatory language
toward him and that another student had informed him that the
victims had written obscene words about the teacher in the snow
near their home. Although neither of the two eleven year old
boys was a student in the teacher's class, he talked to them at his
desk in front of his own students. However, when one of the boys
used vulgar language, he took them into the adjoining cloakroom.
The boys testified that the teacher then hit them eight to twelve
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. at 364, 244 N.E.2d at 635-36.
2 Ill. App. 3d 646, 276 N.E.2d 735 (1971).
Id. at 648, 276 N.E.2d at 736.
17 Ill. App. 3d 553, 308 N.E.2d 196 (1974).
73. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 12-3(a) (1) (1975).
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times on their buttocks and back of their legs with a twelve inch
ruler. Their bruises lasted from one to two weeks and pictures
of them were admitted into evidence.
The teacher contended that he stood in loco parentis to the
students and that he had a duty to discipline them. He further
asserted that a teacher must be allowed broad discretion in
carrying out his responsibilities. The state did not challenge the
teacher's right to inflict corporal punishment, but maintained
that a teacher may only use reasonable force to discipline students who are properly under his authority, and that such authority does not extend to children outside a teacher's class. The
state also argued the teacher used excessive force and acted
maliciously.
In reversing the teacher's conviction,7 the court reasoned
that the teacher could not have ignored the actions and attitudes
of the two boys without forfeiting the respect of all the students
in the school and without creating a climate which would be
detrimental to the educational process.", The court found the
punishment was of a traditional nature applied to the traditional
place and did not constitute a malicious or wanton disregard for
the physical welfare of the boys, even though it unfortunately
resulted in bruises.
Therefore, as long as the teacher's methods are not willful
or wanton misconduct, his in loco parentis status will protect
him from liability for infliction of corporal punishment in disciplinary situations. If the school district prohibits corporal punishment, the teacher may be answerable to his employer for his
acts, but not answerable to the injured student.
Negligent Supervision and Failure to Maintain Discipline
A teacher may also be liable in tort for failure to act in a
situation which proximately results in an injury to a student. The
following cases deal with allegations of insufficient supervision
and injuries caused by others due to alleged breakdowns in the
teachers' responsibility to maintain discipline.
In Woodman v. Litchfield Community School District No.
12,716 an eight year old student was kicked in the head by a
fellow student while she was picking up papers from the floor of
her classroom at the request of the teacher. Woodman alleged
that at the time of the incident, the teacher permitted other
students to move about the room in a disorderly fashion in the
74. 17 Ill.
App. 3d at 556, 308 N.E.2d at 198.

75. Id.
76. 102 Ill. App. 2d 330, 242 N.E.2d 780 (1968).
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area where the plaintiff was located. The trial court granted the
school district's motion to strike the complaint, based on the
provision of the Tort Immunity Act which states: "Except as
otherwise provided by this Act

. .

. neither a local public entity

nor a public employee is liable for an injury caused by a failure
'77
to supervise an activity on or the use of any public property.
Rather than amend, Woodman elected to stand on the complaint. The court dismissed the cause of action, from which
78
order the student appealed.

Woodman argued that the section of the Tort Immunity
Act relied upon in dismissal of her complaint did not apply
because it deals with property conditions or use of public property. Since her injury did not arise out of any alleged condition
or use of school property, but only as a result of negligent
conduct on that site, she contended that the physical condition of
the property or its use were insignificant. The court strictly
construed the section of the Tort Immunity Act in question, and
said that failure to supervise an activity on public property does
not impose liability upon this defendant, unless another section
of the Act specifically created a duty to supervise a particular
type or category of activity. 79 The court held that activities
which occur in a classroom did not fall within this exception.
In affirming the dismissal of Woodman's complaint, the
court also relied on a second section of the Tort Immunity Act
and on the School Code. Section 2-109 of the Act provides: "A
local public entity is not liable for injury resulting from an act
or omission of its employee where the employee is not liable."
The court reasoned that since a teacher was not liable for mere
negligence in supervision or maintenance of discipline because
of the in loco parentis status conferred by the School Code, then
the school district was also free from such liability under the
Tort Immunity Act.
Finally, reasoning that the teacher had a statutory duty to
maintain discipline, including the supervision of the movement
of children in the classroom, the court held that a third section
of the Tort Immunity Act also was applicable. By that section
"[a] public employee is not liable for his act or omission in the
execution or enforcement of any law unless such act or omission
constitutes willful and wanton negligence."8 0 Since no willful
and wanton negligence of the teacher was alleged, the dismissal
of Woodman's complaint was affirmed.8 1
77. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, § 3-108(a) (1975).
78. 102 Ill. App. 2d at 331, 242 N.E.2d at 781.
79. Id. at 332, 242 N.E.2d at 781.
80. ILL. REv.

STAT.

ch. 85, § 2-202 (1975).

81. 102 Ill. App. 2d 334, 242 N.E.2d at 782.

1977]

Immunity of Illinois School Teachers

As the Woodman case evidences, teacher and school district
liability or immunity is based both on common law and on two
areas of statutory law. Fustin v. Board of Education 2 further
demonstrates that this interplay requires an injured student to
use care in drafting his complaint.
The plaintiff in Fustin was a player on the visiting team
involved in a varsity basketball game with the defendant's high
school. Without provocation a player on the host team struck
the plaintiff in the face with his fist, causing injuries. Fustin's
complaint alleged that he was in the exercise of due care; that
the game was controlled, managed and supervised by the defendant through its agents; and charged the defendants with
numerous acts or omissions of negligence in supervision of its
offending player and of the game. The complaint also charged
that the defendant, through its agents, failed to maintain discipline of the players participating in an activity, in violation of
83 "
section 24-24 of the School Code.
Relying on various sections of the Tort Immunity Act,8 4 the
board of education filed a motion to dismiss the complaint as
insufficient, as a matter of law, to allege a cause of action. At
the hearing on the defendant's motion to dismiss, Fustin was
granted leave to amend his complaint by insertion of the
following: "That the defendant has contracted, for liability
insurance to the extent prayed for in the prayer of the plaintiff's
complaint."8 5 The school board admitted the insurance allegation. After a hearing, the trial court ordered the complaint as
amended dismissed and ordered judgment for the defendant,
from which order Fustin appealed.
The appellate court noted that except for the insurance
coverage of the board of education, the issue of negligence due
to improper supervision and enforcement of discipline was the
same as that in Woodman, 6 and that the decision in
82. 101 Ill. App. 2d 113, 242 N.E.2d 308 (1968).
83. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 24-24 (1975). See note 4 supra.
84. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, §§ 3-108, 2-201 and 2-109 (1975). Section

3-108 provides that "except as otherwise provided by this Act...
neither a local public entity nor a public employee is liable for an injury
caused by a failure to supervise an activity on or the use of any public
property."

Section 2-201 provides that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided

by Statute, a public employee serving in a position involving the determination of policy or the exercise of discretion is not liable for an injury
resulting from his act or omission in determining policy when acting
in the exercise of such discretion even though abused."
Section 2-109 provides that "a local public entity is not liable for an
injury resulting from an act or omission of its employee where the employee is not liable."
85. 101 Ill. App. 2d at 116, 242 N.E.2d at 310.
86. 101 Ill. App. 2d 330, 242 N.E.2d 780 (1968). Both Woodman and
Fustin were Fifth District Appellate Court cases decided on the same
day, November 20, 1968.
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Woodman87 would be dispositive of Fustin. Fustin argued that
the defenses provided by the Tort Immunity Act were not
available to the defendant because under the Act the insurance
contract must contain a waiver of those defenses.88
The court found Fustin's insurance argument lacking in
two respects. First, section 9-103 of the Tort Immunity Act
provides a waiver of defenses against liability which may be
imposed under this Act." ' Fustin alleged common law negligence and violation of the School Code, but not liability under
the Tort Immunity Act. Second, the plaintiff failed to allege
that the insurance was contracted for pursuant to the authority
of the Tort Immunity Act which requires that the policy contain
such a waiver of defenses clause. School districts have authority
to purchase liability insurance under the School Code, 90 and

such insurance acquired prior to the enactment of the Tort

Immunity Act does not limit the defenses under the Act.9 1
Therefore, the appellate court affirmed the judgment for the
school board.
While supervising students in order to maintain discipline,
teachers are not subject to an extraordinary standard of care; the
standard is that of the reasonable man under the circumstances.
This standard was applied in Mancha v. Field Museum of

Natural History, ' which involved injury to a student while on a
class trip to a museum. When the fifty students and two
teachers arrived at the museum, the students were allowed to
divide into smaller groups and to view the exhibits without supervision. Mancha, who was of Mexican descent, joined a group of
black students. Mancha's complaint alleged that he was beaten
by several white youths, not connected with the school, for being
87. See text accompanying notes 76-81 supra.
88. The insurance provision of the Tort Immunity Act provides:
(a) A local public entity may contract for insurance against any loss
or liability which may be imposed under this Act ....
(b) Every policy for insurance coverage issued to a local public
entity shall provide or be endorsed to provide that the company
issuing such policy waives any right to refuse payment or to deny
liability thereto within the limits of said policy by reason of the
nonliability of the insured public entity for the wrongful or negligent acts of itself or its employees and its immunity from suit by
reason of the defenses and immunities provided by this Act.
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 85, § 9-103 (1975).
89. Id.
90. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 122, §§ 10-20.20, 34-18.1 (1975).
The School
Code requires each school district's board of education to insure or
indemnify and protect any teacher against financial loss and expense
arising out of any suit or claim of negligence, violation of civil rights,
or wrongful act, provided such teacher was acting within the scope of
his duties.
91. 101 Ill. App. 2d at 118-19, 242 N.E.2d at 310-11.
92. 5 Ill. App. 3d 699, 283 N.E.2d 899 (1972).
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a "nigger lover", and suffered serious injuries as a result of the
attack.
In addition to charges against the Field Museum, Mancha
charged that the school district was negligent in permitting the
students to leave the school premises without adequate supervision. He also charged that the teachers who were assigned to
the class trip were negligent in failing to supervise the activities
of the plaintiff while on the premises of the museum.
The trial court dismissed the plaintiff's third amended complaint for failure to state a cause of action against any of the
defendants. The basis for the trial court's dismissal was that the
common law duty of the defendants to exercise reasonable care
on such a trip did not extend to the risk of foreseeing and
3
guarding against an assault on a student by an outsider.
The appellate court agreed that an assault on a twelve year
old boy in the Field Museum is not an occurrence which a
reasonable man would anticipate. They reasoned that a teacher
cannot be required to watch the students at all times while in
school, on school grounds, or engaged in school-related activity. 94 In dicta, the court also stated that the Tort Immunity Act
and the School Code offered to the school district and teachers
additional defenses of immunity for negligence in supervision
and maintenance of discipline.
In the preceding three cases the courts have determined
that a teacher is immune from liability when he fails to supervise
students in his custody who are injured as a result of a breakdown in discipline. Therefore, a teacher is not liable for injury
sustained by students in his custody when he acts or fails to act
in a disciplinary situation, absent willful and wanton misconduct.
Negligent Supervision Alone
In certain school activities, a student may suffer injury not
inflicted by a teacher, or another student, or an outsider, but
rather incurred due to mere negligent supervision of an activity.
Under such circumstances, discipline is generally not a factor
and the lack of adequate supervision of the student's actions is
the sole question determinative of a teacher's tort liability.
For example, Merrill v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago" dealt
with the issue of whether a nonprofit private school and its staff
were liable for personal injuries suffered at the school by the
student due solely to negligent supervision of the student. In
93. Id. at 700, 283 N.E.2d at 900.
94. Id. at 702, 283 N.E.2d at 902.
95. 8 Ill. App. 3d 910, 290 N.E.2d 259 (1972).
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Merrill a twelve year old parochial school student was sent by his
teacher to a room to cut from a coil lengths of wire to be used
for making sculptures in art class. While doing so he was struck
in the eye by the end of the wire on the coil, causing loss of
vision in that eye. The trial court dismissed Merrill's complaint
for failure to state a cause of action because only negligence was
charged, when the in loco parentis status of schoolteachers
under the School Code requires willful and wanton misconduct
in order for a teacher to be held liable.
Merrill argued that the School Code in loco parentis status of
teachers was limited to disciplinary situations and to public
schoolteachers. In a short opinion, the appellate court concluded that the activity directed by the teacher was part of the
activities of the school program and, therefore, falls within the in
loco parentis status of teachers as provided by the School Code
as interpreted in Woodman.9 6 Woodman held that the School
Code "would protect a teacher from liability for mere negligence
in supervision or maintaining discipline because of the status
conferred.'97 In dealing with the contention that in loco parentis status is limited to public schoolteachers, the court cited
Haymes v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago,"" and said it could see
no reason why section 24-24 of the School Code should not be
equally applicable to private schools. 90 The judgment of the
trial court dismissing Merrill's complaint was therefore affirmed.
Though the Illinois Supreme Court had not decided a case
involving a school district's liability for negligent injury to
a student since Molitor, Kobylanski v. Chicago Board of
00
dealt with that issue. In Kobylanski the Illinois
Education'
Supreme Court decided an appeal involving two consolidated
cases which presented the common issue of whether teachers
and school districts can be held liable for injuries to students
resulting from allegedly negligent conduct by teachers, or whether the greater burden of willful and wanton misconduct must be
proved in order to impose liability.
In the first of the consolidated cases, Barbara Kobylanski
suffered spinal injuries when she fell while attempting to perform a knee-hang exercise from gymnastic rings used in her
seventh grade physical education class. Prior to her fall, the
teacher had given instructions to the class on the performance of
96. See text accompanying notes 76-81 supra.

97. 102 Ill. App. 2d 330, 333-34, 242 N.E.2d 780, 782 (1968) (emphasis
added).
98. 41 Ill. 2d 336, 243 N.E.2d 203 (1968). See note 36 supra.
99. 8 Ill. App. 3d at 911, 290 N.E.2d at 260.
100. 63 Ill.
2d 165, 347 N.E.2d 705 (1976).
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this exercise. Kobylanski's amended complaint was filed under
the Tort Immunity Act' 01 and alleged that the school district
and the teacher negligently failed to provide proper instruction
and supervision. The defendants denied the allegations of negligence and set forth, as an affirmative defense, section 34-84a of
the School Code10 2 which, they maintained, required the plaintiff
to prove willful and wanton misconduct in order to recover. Kobylanski did not contend that the evidence presented at trial was
sufficient to establish willful and wanton misconduct. Following the plaintiff's case in chief, the trial court directed a verdict in
favor of the defendants. The Appellate Court, First District
10 3
(2nd Division), affirmed.
In the second of the consolidated cases, Chilton v. Cook
County School District No. 207,104 Suzanne Chilton suffered
spinal injuries when attempting to perform a front-drop maneuver on a trampoline in her required high school physical education course. Chilton had experienced some difficulty in performing the front-drop exercise, but had been encouraged by her
instructor not to be fearful. Chilton's second amended complaint was predicated upon common-law negligence and alleged
that the school district failed to provide proper supervision, failed
to require increased supervision as trampoline accidents occurred
more frequently, and failed to test beginners in order to determine who was capable of taking a trampoline course. The
complaint also charged that the teacher failed to properly supervise the class, and forced Chilton to perform the maneuver after
it became obvious that she lacked confidence and had considerable difficulty in performing it.
The trial court refused to instruct the jury that a willful and
wanton standard, rather than a negligence standard, was applicable and held that section 24-24 of the School Code applied
only to teacher-student disciplinary situations. Chilton did not
contend that the evidence was sufficient to find willful and wanton misconduct. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Chilton
against the school district only. The school district, at trial and
on appeal, argued that Chilton's complaint failed to allege willful
and wanton misconduct as required by section 24-24 of the
School Code. The Appellate Court, First District (5th Division), affirmed. '0 5
101.
102.
103.
N.E.2d

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, §§ 1-101 to 10-101 (1975) (amended 1976).
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 34-84a (1975). See note 4 supra.
Kobylanski v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 22 Ill. App. 3d 551, 317
714 (1974).

104. 26 Ill.
App. 3d 459, 325 N.E.2d 666 (1975).
105. Id.
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The Illinois Supreme Court, in a four to three decision, interpreted the disciplinary sections of the School Code, which grant
in loco parentis status to teachers. Justice Kluczynski, writing
for the majority, found that the language of the School Code disciplinary sections was intended to confer in loco parentis status in
nondisciplinary as well as disciplinary matters.'0 6 The majority
cited Woodman, °7 Fustin,0 8 Mancha'0 9 and Merrill' ° as support for this finding. Also, the court's construction of the Code
was based on the specific wording of the Code, which provides
that "[i] n all matters relating to the discipline in and conduct of
the schools and the school children, teachers stand in the relation
of parents and guardians to the pupils.""' The majority then
reasoned that since physical education is a required part of the
conduct of the schools," 2 the in loco parentis status of teachers
applied to the activity in which Kobylanski and Chilton were
injured. 1 3
In construing the meaning of the in loco parentis status of
teachers, the majority relied on People v. Ball 1 4 which held that
in situations involving the imposition of corporal punishment,
teachers enjoy no greater rights, nor are they entitled to any
greater protection, than parents. From this holding, the majority reasoned that teachers should not be subjected to any greater
liability than parents, who are liable to their children for willful
and wanton misconduct, but not for mere negligence. 1 5 The
majority concluded that teachers are not liable for mere negligence in nondisciplinary and disciplinary matters, and that an
injured student must prove willful and wanton misconduct in
order to establish liability of the teachers and school districts.'"6
Therefore, the court affirmed Kobylanski and reversed Chilton.
The dissenting opinion written by Justice Goldenhersh attacked virtually every point of the majority opinion. As to the
2d 165, 171-72, 347 N.E.2d 705, 708 (1976).
106. 63 Ill.
107. 102 Ill. App. 2d 330, 242 N.E.2d 780 (1968). See text accompanying notes 76-81 supra.
App. 2d 113, 242 N.E.2d 308 (1968). See text accompany108. 101 Ill.
ing notes 82-91 supra.
109. 5 Ill. App. 3d 699, 283 N.E.2d 899 (1972). See text accompanying
notes 92-94 supra.
110. 8 Ill. App. 3d 910, 290 N.E.2d 259 (1972). See text accompanying
notes 95-99 supra.
111. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, §§ 24-24, 34-84a (1975) (emphasis added
in the opinion). See note 4 supra.
112. Id. §§ 27-5 to 27-7.
2d at 172, 347 N.E.2d at 708.
113. 63 Ill.
114. 58 Ill. 2d 36, 317 N.E.2d 54 (1974) (in affirming teacher's conviction of criminal battery for use of excessive force in paddling disobedient student, the court said teachers should be subject to the same
standard of reasonableness which has long been applicable to parents
in disciplining their children).
115. 63 Ill. 2d at 172-73, 347 N.E.2d at 709.
116. Id. at 173, 347 N.E.2d at 709.
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interpretation of the language of sections 24-24 and 34-84a of
the School Code, the dissenting justices construed the second
sentence 117 to properly read "all matters related to the discipline
in the schools and the conduct of the school children.""18 They
criticized the majority's use of the phrase "conduct of the
schools" as having been taken out of context and as having been
given independent significance." 9 The dissent contended that
if the word "conduct" refers to the schools rather than to the
school children, then the following sentence, which provides that
"[t]his relationship shall extend to all activities connected
with the school program, 1 1 20 is redundant.1 2 1 In addition, in
arguing that the Code is inapplicable to nondisciplinary matters,
the dissent pointed out that section 24-24 is headed "Maintenance of Discipline" and section 34-84a is headed "Teachers
22
shall maintain discipline.'
The dissent disagreed with the majority's use of Fustin and
Woodman as support for their proposition that sections 24-24
and 34-84a of the Code applied to all activities connected with
the school program. The dissent pointed out that Fustin was
decided solely on the basis of the Tort Immunity Act,1 23 and
that Woodman decided a question of teacher liability in the
124
course of maintaining discipline.
If, as the majority held, sections 24-24 and 34-84a of the
School Code grant in loco parentis status to teachers and their
school district employers in all activities within the conduct of
the schools, then, in Justice Goldenhersh's opinion, the constitutional validity of those sections of the Code is doubtful. In his
view, Harvey' 25 firmly established the principle that classification designed to confer immunity on a local governmental entity
must be based, not on the nature of the entity, but on the type of
activity or function involved. The majority decision in the
present case found the defendant school districts not liable for
negligent conduct which, according to the dissenting opinion,
would subject other governmental units to liability.
Finally, the dissenting opinion noted that the majority, and
apparently all the parties in the appeal, accepted as settled law
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

See note 4 supra.
63 Ill. 2d at 176, 347 N.E.2d at 711.
Id.
See note 4 supra.
63 Ill.
2d at 176, 347 N.E.2d at 711.
Id.

123. 63 Ill. 2d at 177-78, 347 N.E.2d-at 711-12. See text accompanying
notes 82-91 supra.
124. 63 Ill.
2d at 178, 347 N.E.2d at 712. See text accompanying notes
76-81 supra.
125. 32 Ill.
2d 60, 203 N.E.2d 573 (1965). See text accompanying notes
31-34 supra.
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that a parent is not liable for injuries to his child absent willful
and wanton misconduct. The dissent pointed out that the Illinois Supreme Court has never decided that question. 126 In
conclusion, Chief Justice Ward, Justice Schaefer and Justice
Goldenhersh, all in dissent, would reverse the judgment in Kobylanski and affirm the judgment in Chilton.
The Illinois Supreme Court has thus construed the in loco
parentis status of teachers as applicable to any activity within the
conduct of the schools. Therefore, teachers and school districts
are not liable for injury to a student in nondisciplinary as well as
disciplinary situations, absent willful and wanton misconduct.
Infringement of Civil Rights

"

Not all suits for damages brought by students against
teachers and school districts arise out of physical injuries to the
students. Any United States citizen who is deprived of his
constitutional rights by a person acting under color of state
authority may bring suit for damages against the violator of that
1 27
citizen's rights.
In Picha v. Wielgos, 12 a thirteen year old student, alleging a
violation of her constitutional right to privacy, sued the principal
of her school for damages after the principal ordered her
searched for illegal drugs. The principal caused the police to be
called and, after their arrival, he had the school nurse and the
school psychologist search the student. No drugs were found.
The principal moved for a directed verdict on the grounds
12
that he was immune from liability under Wood v. Strickland. 0
Wood held that in the special context of school discipline, a
school official is immune from liability for damages in a suit
brought by a student under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, unless
the official knew or reasonably should have known that the
action he took within his sphere of official responsibility would
violate the constitutional rights of the student affected, or unless
the official took the action with the malicious intention to cause
a deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury to the
student.130 Thus Wood held that an award of damages to the
student will be appropriate only if the school official has acted
with such an impermissible motivation or with such disregard of
the student's clearly established constitutional rights that his
126. 63 Ill. 2d at 178-79, 347 N.E.2d at 712. See text accompanying
notes 50-65 supra.
127. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
128. 410 F. Supp. 1214 (N.D. Ill. 1976).
129. 420 U.S. 308 (1975).

130. Id. at 322.

1977]

Immunity of Illinois School Teachers

In
action cannot be characterized as being in good faith.'
Picha, Judge Flaum held that the student possessed settled,
undisputed constitutional rights, and that there was sufficient
evidence to permit a jury to consider whether these rights had
been violated by the lack of good faith in the principal's ac13 2
tions.
In denying the principal's motion for a directed verdict, the
court noted the in loco parentis status of Illinois school officials.
The court found that the activities of a school official or teacher
standing in loco parentis must be considered the activities of a
state official, and the constraints which flow from the Bill of
As an example of the constraints
Rights are applicable. 13 3
placed on a state official who stands in loco parentis, Judge
Flaum stated that a parent could make his child salute the flag
without being subject to a civil rights suit, but a schoolteacher
could not enforce the same commandment without violating the
student's first amendment rights. 13 4 As another example, he
noted that a parent may arbitrarily punish his child whereas a
teacher may not.' 3 5 Judge Flaum reasoned that a state can no
more limit its civil rights obligations by means of the in loco
parentis doctrine than it can explicitly grant immunity to a
36
public official for misuse of his office.'
In the context of constitutional law, the court found that an
in loco parentis statute was an expression of a substantial state
interest against which a student's constitutional rights must be
balanced.1 3 7 The district court concluded that when Picha was
searched, her constitutional right not to be searched by school
officials who were in contact with the police was violated, unless
the intrusion was justified by the state's interest in maintaining
supervision and education of the
the order, discipline, safety,
38
student within the school.1
Therefore, the immunity of a teacher arising out of his in
loco parentis status is not absolute when a student's civil rights
are violated. For the in loco parentis immunity defense to be
valid, the student's behavior must be in violation of certain state
interests.
131. Id.
132. 410 F. Supp. at 1216.
133. Id. at 1217.

134. Id. (citing West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624 (1943)).
135. Id. (citing Boykin v. Fairfield Bd. of Educ., 492 F.2d 697 (5th
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 962 (1975)).
136. Id. at 1218.
137. Id. at 1219.
138. Id. at 1221.
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APPLICATION OF PARENTAL

IMMUNITY

TO SCHOOLTEACHERS

As has been noted, the School Code confers in loco parentis status on schoolteachers. 139 The supreme court has interpreted the School Code as applying this status in disciplinary as
well as nondisciplinary matters. 140 The reasonableness of the in
loco parentis status of teachers in disciplinary matters has never
been questioned in an Illinois case, but the reasonableness of the
status in nondisciplinary matters is disputed.' 4 1 To analyze the
application of parental immunity to teachers, it is necessary to
understand the nature of parental immunity and its justification,
and then to evaluate the appropriateness of applying it to teachers in the school setting.
Justificationfor ParentalImmunity

The Illinois Supreme Court has not yet decided on its
merits the issue of whether a parent is immune from liability for
negligent acts causing injury to his child. 42 Taking into consideration the supreme court's dicta 143 and the appellate court
decisions on this issue, 144 the supreme court would probably find
immunity for a parent's negligent injury to his child. On the
appellate level, the common law of Illinois is that parents are
immune from liability for their negligent acts committed while
the parent and injured child were engaged in conduct arising out
of the family relationship or in furtherance of the usual family
objectives. 145 This qualified parental immunity in Illinois is
justified on two public policy grounds: a desire to maintain
domestic serenity, and the fear of a flood of litigation.
Domestic Serenity
In Nudd v. Matsoukas,146 the supreme court balanced the

social benefit of domestic serenity against the injustice of allowing an injured child to go without redress for willful and wanton
parental misconduct. In favoring redress for the child, the court

found that the only justification for parental immunity was a
reluctance to create litigation and strife between members of the
family. Thus, although lawsuits by children against their par139. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, §§ 24-24, 34-84a (1975).

See note 4 supra.

140. Kobylanski v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 63 Ill. 2d 165, 171-72, 347
N.E.2d 705, 708 (1976).
See text accompanying notes 106-26 supra.
141. See text accompanying notes 107, 117-22 supra.

142. See text accompanying note 126 supra.
143. See text accompanying notes 55, 115 supra.
144. See text accompanying notes 57-58, 62-65 supra.
145. See text accompanying note 58 supra.
146. 7 Ill. 2d 601, 131 N.E.2d 525 (1956).
See text accompanying
notes 55-56 supra.

19771

Immunity of Illinois School Teachers

ents should not be encouraged since they tend to disturb the
cordial family relationship and render parental discipline ineffective, exceptions to this justification for parental immunity do
exist.
A breakdown in the cordial family relationship is going to
occur whenever one family member sues another, especially if
they reside in the same household. Yet this domestic serenity
foundation is outweighed by the public policy of permitting
redress for injury of a family member when such injury occurs
outside the scope of acts considered in furtherance of family
1 47
objectives.
One major family objective and duty is to raise children to
become responsible adults. To accomplish this objective, it is
often necessary to establish behavioral standards, and, in many
circumstances, it is necessary to enforce these standards with
physical discipline. The purpose of discipline is to make a
child's misbehavior a painful experience. This is important
since from early in life children can distinguish between their
actions resulting in pain and those resulting in encouragement.
The infliction of pain upon another is generally actionable at
law, but to allow a child to bring a lawsuit against his parent
every time he is disciplined would destroy the means of implementing a legitimate family purpose and duty of the parents.
The child would be the ultimate loser.
Flood of Litigation
In Schenk v. Schenk, 148 the appellate court opposed the
total abolition of parental immunity because that would result in
a flood of litigation, with the courts or the state assuming the
role of father of the family. This justification for retaining
parental immunity is questionable.
The flood of litigation argument in support of parental
immunity is purely speculative; it is an assertion which has not
been subjected to verification. Eleven states have either abolished or rejected the parental tort immunity rule. 149 In these
147. See text accompanying note 58 supra.
148. 100 Ill. App. 2d 199, 241 N.E.2d 12 (1968).

See text accompanying

notes 59-61 supra.
149. The following states have judicially abolished parental immunity:
Arizona in Streenz v. Streenz, 106 Ariz. 86, 471 P.2d 282 (1970); California in Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 479 P.2d 648, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288
(1971); Kentucky in Rigdon v. Rigdon, 465 S.W.2d 921 (Ky. 1970);
Michigan in Plumbley v. Klein, 388 Mich. 1, 199 N.W.2d 169 (1972);
New Hampshire in Briere v. Briere, 107 N.H. 432, 224 A.2d 588
(1966); New Jersey in France v. A.P.A. Transport Corp., 56 N.J. 500, 267
A.2d 490 (1970); New York in Graney v. Graney, 43 App. Div. 2d 207,
350 N.Y.S.2d. 207 (1973), aff'd, 36 N.Y.2d 35, 324 N.E.2d 338, 364 N.Y.S.2d.
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states, no measurable increase of litigation by children against
their parents has occurred, and the courts have not intruded
upon the traditional family structure to any objectionable degree. Therefore, the flood of litigation argument for justification of parental immunity is tenuous.
Reasonableness of Application to Teachers
The concept of in loco parentis status of Illinois schoolteachers did not originate with the addition of sections 24-24
and 34-84a to the School Code in 1965, but rather existed in
Illinois common law prior to its inclusion in the School Code. In
Drake v. Thomas, 150 the court held that a teacher stands in loco
parentis because the authority of a teacher over his pupil is a
delegation of at least a portion of parental authority where
corporal punishment is involved.
Recently, in Kobylanski, both injured students argued that
sections 24-24 and 34-84a of the School Code represent a mere
codification of the common law rule in Illinois that a teacher
stands in the place of a parent for purposes of discipline, including the administration of corporal punishment.'
Regardless of
whether the in loco parentis status of teachers is common law or
codified, the reasons for applying parental immunity to school
teachers must be analyzed.
Disciplinary Matters
If the sole purpose of parental immunity is to reduce
litigation and strife between members of the family unit,' 52 then
its application to teachers through in loco parentis standing is
unreasonable since teachers are not members of the student's
family. A student's tort action seeking a remedy for his teacher's negligent conduct would have no disruptive effect on the
student's intra-family cordiality.
However, when a teacher disciplines a student for individual misbehavior or disruption of the educational process, the
teacher is helping the student's parents accomplish the objective
859 (1974); Pennsylvania in Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372, 282 A.2d 351
(1971); and Virginia in Smith v. Kauffman, 212 Va. 181, 183 S.E.2d 190
(1971).
The following states have rejected parental immunity without having been previously committed to the rule: Alaska in Hebel v. Hebel,
435 P.2d 8 (Alaska 1967); and Hawaii in Petersen v. Honolulu, 51 Hawaii
484, 462 P.2d 1007 (1970).
150. 310 Ill. App. 57, 33 N.E.2d 889 (1941).
151. Brief for Appellant Kobylanski at 24-25, Brief for Appellant
Chilton at 20, Kobylanski v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 63 Ill. 2d 165, 347
N.E.2d 705 (1976).

152. See text accompanying note 55 supra.
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of guiding their children to responsible adulthood through conformity with behavioral standards. Since discipline may involve
pain or injury, whether inflicted upon the student at home or at
school, teachers must have the same standards of immunity from
liability for negligent disciplinary acts as parents do.
While enforcing behavioral standards, the teacher should
be immune for his negligent acts, absent willful and wanton
misconduct, just as a parent is immune from liability for the
same acts. In the school setting, it would then be reasonable for
the teacher to have in loco parentis immunity in any action he
takes where a student is violating a school regulation or disrupt15 3
ing the educational process.
NondisciplinaryMatters
In Kobylanski, the supreme court held that the in loco
parentis standing of teachers applied to nondisciplinary as well
as disciplinary matters.15 4 They based their decision on the
wording of the School Code without discussion of the reasonableness of their interpretation of the wording. 155 By finding in
loco parentis standing for teachers in all matters relating to the
conduct of the schools, the court granted broad immunity without any reasonable justification in terms of parental immunity.
Reduction of litigation and strife between family members
is not achieved by the in loco parentis status of teachers in
nonbehavioral matters because teachers are not members of the
student's family. A student's guidance to responsible adulthood
is not enhanced by barring redress for injury caused by the
teacher's negligent nondisciplinary act. In fact, a student's respect for his teacher may be destroyed when the student learns
that his teacher may act irresponsibly with impunity.
It may be argued that parents have delegated the duty to
educate their children to the schools, and therefore the teachers
have parental immunity in any matters of school conduct. However, Illinois children between the ages of seven and sixteen
years must be enrolled in school, and any child enrolled in
grades one through twelve must attend. 156 Since parents are
compelled by law to send their children to school, they have no
discretionary power to delegate the education of their children to
153. While not all schools employ corporal punishment, in those that
do, it is only part of an integrated disciplinary procedure. Detention and
suspension play a more important role in maintenance of discipline.
Estep, School Discipline Is Just A Whack Away, Chicago Tribune, Nov. 2,
1976, at 1, col. 1.

154. 63 Ill. 2d at 171-72, 347 N.E.2d at 708.
155. See text accompanying notes 111-13 supra.
156. ILL. REV. STAT, ch. 122, §§ 26-1, 26-2 (1975).
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the schools. Therefore, parental immunity in nondisciplinary
conduct of the schools is not conferred upon the teachers by
parental consent.
No public policy or social benefit is promoted when a
teacher is free from liability for failure to properly instruct a
student in an activity which may subject the student to injury.
When a student is injured in a physical education class, or
industrial arts class, or driver education class because of the
teacher's failure to properly instruct or observe that student's
performance, nobody benefits by the teacher's immunity from
negligence except the culpable teacher. Therefore, extension of
the in loco parentis status of teachers to all matters relating to
the conduct of the school is unreasonable and unjustifiable.
The Special Legislation Problem
The constitutionality of the application of in loco parentis
status to teachers in all matters relating to the conduct of the
schools has been questioned. 157 The basis for a constitutional
attack on such a broad extension of immunity for teachers lies in
the Illinois Constitution's prohibition against special legislation. 158
In Harvey v. Clyde Park District,15 9 the supreme court gave
guidelines for legislation conferring tort immunity which, if
followed, would avoid the special legislation problem. The court
advised that legislation which would grant immunity to governmental agencies and their employees according to the type of
function engaged in would be constitutional. Subsequently, the
supreme court held that a statute classifying persons or objects is
not unconstitutional because it affects one class and not another.
However, it must affect all members of the same class alike, and
must not be arbitrary, but based upon some substantial difference in circumstances properly related to the classification.' 60
While it is true that a child injured on a trampoline,
because of careless supervision by an instructor, may have a
157. See text accompanying note 125 supra.
158. "The General Assembly shall pass no special or local law when a

general law is or can be made applicable. Whether a general law is or
can be made applicable shall be a matter for judicial determination."
ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 13 (1970).

159. 32 Ill. 2d 60, 203 N.E. 2d 573 (1965). See text accompanying notes
31-35 supra.
160. Hamilton Corp. v. Alexander, 53 Ill. 2d 175, 290 N.E.2d 589 (1972)
(issue was whether the Forcible Entry and Detainer Act requirement that

notice of appeal be filed within five days after judgment was a denial of
equal protection because in other cases a notice of appeal may be filed
within 30 days of judgment; held: no denial of equal protection).
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remedy if the injury occurred at a YMCA but no remedy if it
occurred in a physical education class at school, it does not
necessarily follow that the School Code's grant of in loco parentis immunity is special legislation and therefore unconstitutional.
Applying the function test, the grant of in loco parentis status to
teachers in all matters relating to the conduct of the schools falls
within the function of teaching in schools. Applying the arbitrariness test, school districts may be in a class with other
insured public entities and teachers may be in a class with other
school employees, but school districts and teachers are also in a
class by themselves because of the unique role they play in the
educational development of school age children in Illinois.'0 '
Since all school districts and teachers are similarly treated under
sections 24-24 and 34-84a of the School Code, there is no
violation of the constitutional prohibition against special legisla62
tion.'
CONCLUSION

As a result of Kobylanski, a teacher is immune from liability for his wrongful acts causing physical injury to a student in all
matters relating to the conduct of the school, absent willful and
wanton misconduct. Under the doctrine of in loco parentis
which is incorporated in the School Code and interpreted by the
Illinois Supreme Court, the teacher and his employer are not
liable to the student for injuries caused by negligence, regardless
of the fact that the student was not misbehaving at the time. The
reasonableness of this immunity in nondisciplinary matters is
very questionable, since it is not related to any valid public
policy or social benefit.
On the other hand, a teacher is liable to the student for
damages when the teacher in bad faith violates an established
constitutional right of the student, unless such an intrusion of
the student's rights is outweighed by the need for maintaining
order, discipline and safety in the schools-all matters involving
the student's behavior. 163 Thus, a teacher's immunity from
liability under the in loco parentis concept is broader when the
student is physically injured than when a student's constitutional
rights are violated.
At common law, teachers have immunity from liability for
their negligent acts in disciplinary matters. A reasonable as161. Kobylanski v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 63 Ill. 2d 165, 175, 347 N.E.2d
705, 710 (1976).
162. Id.
163. See text accompanying notes 133-38 supra.
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sumption is that the drafters of sections 24-24 and 34-84a of the
School Code intended to codify the existing common law doctrine of in loco parentis status of teachers. If this assumption is
valid, then the General Assembly has the responsibility of clarifying its intentions by eliminating the immunity of teachers in
nondisciplinary matters.
James A. Wille

